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Buddhist Thought and Particularity: 
Thurman and Abe on a Nondualistic Middle Way
Henry  s im o n i-W a stila
BUDDHIST traditions have developed diverse and sophisticated descrip­tions of the relationship of Nirvana (Skt. nirvana) to samsara (Skt. 
samsara). In order to limit the range of these possibilities, we will focus on 
the positions of two modem Buddhist writers: Robert Thurman and Masao 
Abe. In trying to interpret their views, we will, at times, translate the concern 
for the relation of Nirvana and samsara into Western terms, specifically, the 
relation of particularity to God. Our goal is not to assert the equivalency of 
God and Nirvana (or of particularity to samsara), but to focus on different 
ways of relating two discreet planes of reality. We should say “apparently” 
discreet planes of reality because, from the perspective of the Buddhist tra­
dition, one should maintain a skeptical attitude to the assumption that phe­
nomenally discreet entities are discreet in reality. Nevertheless, we will find 
interesting harmonies between how the relationship of Ultimate Reality to 
conventional reality is conceived and how the relationship of particularity to 
God operates in a pluralistic perspective.
Particularity, as we will use the term, refers, not to the ontological reifi­
cation of a self, but to the unique experiential quality that constitutes each 
person (in each of that person’s experiences). Particularity is the perspectival 
uniqueness of conscious individuals who have subjective innemess. This 
subjective innemess is in flux. From moment to moment each human expe­
rience is a different particular experience. Thus, particularity is not a claim 
for a persistent, self-identical self or soul.
The postulation of radical particularity is a stronger claim than that which
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states particular persons have a subjective side. Radical particularity means 
that the particularity we sense at a prima facie level is not merely a surface 
phenomenon, but is a particularity that maintains itself at a root level. The 
particularity of events remains in any deep description of reality, a reality 
which is ultimately pluralistic. In other words, radical particularity implies 
that there is no grand monistic unification of the world in which the unique 
perspective of individuals is subsumed or negated.
The problem o f  radical particularity asks how separate individuals with 
unique perspectives can form intimate relationships. If the core reality o f a be­
ing is unique and unrepeatable, what does relationship mean? What does it 
mean for two realities to share if  they do not have access to each other’s heart 
of hearts? Is relationship merely a matter of peripheral interactions? Specifi­
cally, does compassion require an empathy in which there is a full co-feeling 
of the experience of the other? If living things are separate to the extent that 
they have unique subjectivities, is relationship merely an exchange at an ex­
ternal level, leaving the inner core directly unaffected? This difficulty in con­
ceiving relationship is what is meant by the problem of radical particularity.
Furthermore, there is a special application of the problem of radical par­
ticularity for the philosophy of religion. How does the individual person 
relate to a Higher Reality within a metaphysics of particularity? If a unique 
point of view is only available to an individual as that individual, how could 
a Higher Reality include, know or have compassion for such a particular be­
ing? Is there a fundamental aloneness into which even the Ultimate cannot 
intrude? One might accept separation between the cores of human persons as 
a function of what must be the case in a world of several conscious beings; 
but is it as easy to conceive of God or Buddha as similarly separate? The goal 
of our present discussion is to explore what a Buddhist response might be to 
the “theological” problem of radical particularity (to use a Western formula­
tion of the problematic). In doing so, we will ask how Buddhists might con­
ceive of the relationship of conventional reality to Ultimate Reality within a 
metaphysics of radical particularity.
We should remain aware that the Buddhist tradition often seeks to avoid 
metaphysical issues for soteriological, or salvific, reasons. Perhaps the meta­
physical minutiae which the problem of radical particularity addresses could 
be seen as a question outside the practical purview of Buddhist soteriology. 
Is it possible to transcend the types of questions we are asking in order to 
formulate a salvific religious perspective? Yet, to the extent Buddhists have 
addressed metaphysics, we may ask: Do Buddhist thinkers offer a way of
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conceiving relationality that is cognizant of what we have called radical par­
ticularity? Using the positions of Thurman and Abe, we will conclude that 
the Buddhist tradition does, in fact, have important resources in dealing with 
the question of radical particularity.
Inwardness and the Non-Self
We are completely candid throughout the following discussions that we are 
asking a question which arises from a Western metaphysical perspective. Yet 
we ask in order to see what light the Buddhist tradition might shed. Does 
Buddhist thought possess analogous concepts to particularity? Does it some­
how resolve the problem of radical particularity? Or does it deny the very 
perspective from which the question is asked as a matter not conducive to 
enlightenment?
Our questioning begins with a specific perspective on what it means to be 
an individual, a particular thing. To be an individual, especially an individ­
ual human being, means to be different and separate from other people. To 
be a person is to possess a sense of inwardness. Through introspection, we 
become aware that this subjective inwardness is not available to be fully 
appropriated by other people. We always exist as separate individuals to 
some extent. It is true that the experiences of other people are available to us 
both emotionally and objectively. And we may be empathetic and compas­
sionate towards others. Yet, only our own experience has a sense o f mine- 
ness. Our ownership of our particular experience appears unique. We know 
this phenomenologically—this is how our experience appears to us, or at 
least this is our hypothesis. My ownership of my experience is different than 
your ownership of yours. Because one person’s identity is always partially 
disconnected from another person’s, relationality becomes problematic. We 
never seem to be able to relate at a core level because other people’s cores 
are simply not experientially available to us.
The presentation of particularity must be limited in scope here, but a fur­
ther analysis of particularity and its implications for philosophy of religion 
are available elsewhere.1 Immediately, however, the particularity of the per­
son needs to be distinguished from the Buddhist concept of the non-self 
(anatman). Particularity does not mean the self is an unchanging agent that is 
ontologically self-caused. Neither does particularity imply the complete 
exclusion of others. According to our theory, a particular person may be in
1 Simoni-Wastila 1997a, 1997b; 1999.
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flux, may be contingent, may be affected by others and may be set within a 
chain of causes. Particularity refers to the interiority of the person as an indi­
vidual.
There is, perhaps, an internal problem of radical particularity in under­
standing personhood: How do the individual experiences a person has form 
a whole? In answering that question, it becomes evident that a non-reified 
self is a consequence of radical particularity. This is because each radically 
particular experience is separate from other radically particular experiences 
of the “same” person.
As we have already touched upon, there is a fundamental problem with the 
metaphysics of radical particularity. If, in fact, individuals are unique, it ap­
pears that their full individuality is not translatable by any sort of Ultimate 
Being or Non-being. What would it mean for a universal being to be con­
tained within the limits of a particular being in order to.know that particular 
being as it is? As noted, this is the theological problem of radical particu­
larity. Just as it is difficult to conceive how relationship between particular 
humans beings is possible, it is difficult to know what relationship means 
between any sort of Ultimate Reality and persons.
The issue is even more pressing if one takes the religious relationship as 
meaning that Ultimate Reality has full access to the subjectivity of the per­
son. Does compassion (Skt. karuna) require that one fully know or empathize 
with the particularity of each person? Regarding the Western notion o f omni­
science, we have shown elsewhere that is difficult to assert that God knows 
human inwardness in exactitude.2 To the extent that God and Buddha-nature 
are comparable, there may also be difficulties in showing how Buddha could 
be compassionate, if  compassion requires a completely inclusive empathy.
Dependent Co-arising and Own-Being
So far, we have seen that particularity does not imply a reified self. A partic­
ular personality, as we have conceived it, is not an unchanging entity or soul. 
We can also immediately make reference to an aspect of Buddhist thought 
which stresses the interrelatedness of all things. All things are said to arise as 
a result of pratityasamutpada, dependent co-arising. This would seem to 
place each entity within a causally determined context. Because we have 
spoken of the separateness of entities, it is not clear whether radical particu­
larity is set within a causal network in this way.
We will begin by interpreting pratityasamutpada in terms of physical 
2 Simoni-Wastila 1997a.
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causality. To be a radically particular being does not mean that one is fully 
isolated from a context of others. If we take the example of a cake, we will 
see that the cake is composed of flour, water, sugar, etc.3 There is no ingre­
dient “cake” which is added. A cake is composed of elements that are al­
ready there; the cake, therefore, appears not to be a radically separate being. 
Likewise, people are not totally de novo. A human being may be seen as the 
aggregate of molecules which have played a causal role in the body’s devel­
opment. Radical particularity does not deny this causal role.
However, the metaphysics that results from the implications o f radical 
particularity denies that an analysis of components can describe the experi­
ence of the whole. The phenomenological aspect, the actual lived experi­
ence, of a person is different than any objective biological account, no matter 
how complete. And the fact that a particular person is within a field o f others 
that help condition it does not deny that one’s experience is one’s own. One 
may have a unique perspective, even if it is in relation to others. The crux of 
the issue is that there is a difference between the manner in which a person 
exists in a context and the objective fact that a person exists in a context. 
Thus, to say that we live in a causal chain of dependent co-arising does not 
negate the individuality and uniqueness of each experience. The manner in 
which we exist includes privacy and subjective difference.
As a religious doctrine, however, the idea of dependent co-arising prima­
rily means that the root of suffering relates to ignorance. The denial that the 
inwardness of each person is available to others is a separate claim. Thus, 
whether dependent co-arising is interpreted as physical causality or as a reli­
gious doctrine, it is not directed against what we are asserting concerning 
radical particularity.
A second important Buddhist concept that is immediately relevant to a 
discussion of particularity is the denial of svabhava, the position that things 
do not have own-being. Our presentation of radical particularity seems to 
maintain that persons have a sense of personal ownership of their being— 
that only they have a sense of mineness regarding their experience. However, 
radical particularity does not mean that individuals are self-existent. The 
uniqueness of particular events does not mean that they somehow give them­
selves the power to exist. Thus, radical particularity does not mean things 
have own-being in the sense of being self-caused. As we noted, the fact that 
things exist in a context of causes does not mean they cannot be radically 
particular.
3 Thandeka, in public lecture.
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Furthermore, if we take the Buddhist claim against own-being as a claim 
that one cannot find out what an object is in isolation because of the co­
implication of other things, this still does not make radical particularity im­
possible. Edward Conze describes this meaning of own-being: “A thing is 
never found by itself alone, but always together with others which ‘stand 
around it’, and constitute its ‘circumstances’. As soon as we try to find out 
where a thing ends and where its circumstances, or conditions, begin, we no 
longer know where we stand.”4 It is true that causal links can be found be­
tween individual conscious beings and the world. However, the inability to 
give an account o f one thing without referring to others does not mean there 
is no subjective separation. For example, the knowledge that one person is in 
the same gravitational field (along with knowledge of all further facts) as a 
second person does not give the second person access to the interiority o f the 
first person. The ultimate evidence for radical particularity is an intuition 
into the phenomenological experience of what it means to be an individual. 
This introspective intuition does not rely upon pure isolation, but interiority.
4 Conze 1967, p. 144.
5 Ibid., pp.239-240.
6 Simoni-Wastila 1997a, 1997b, 1999.
It is only fair to admit that Conze’s further account of own-being does tend 
towards defining own-being in a similar manner to how we have defined rad­
ical particularity.5 Thus, the Buddhist tradition might take the definition of 
radical particularity which we have offered as provisionally problematical. 
However, our goal here is not to fully present the theory o f radical particu­
larity; further articulation of its metaphysics is available elsewhere.6 Nev­
ertheless, radical particularity does not mean that individuals are utterly 
isolated from reality, but that their inner subjective experience is special, 
unique and non-transferable. Radical particularity is not asserting a causal 
isolation in which a being is divorced from the world as a totally independent 
“me.” Rather, particularity is the phenomenological or experiential sense of 
otherness or mineness.
Robert Thurman’s Middle Position
Having preliminarily differentiated radical particularity from some potential 
misinterpretations, we can enter a discussion with more developed Buddhist 
views. Robert Thurman notes a general philosophical problem in the con­
ceptualizing of the relationship of the ultimate and the relative:
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Dualism in its extreme form radically separates the ultimate from 
the relative, arguing for an absolute lack of connection between the 
two, the absolute “transcendentality” of the ultimate. Examples of 
such dualism abound in Judea-Christo-Islamic traditions in the ar­
guments of individuals who insist on the total “otherness” of God 
—His namelessness, unsymbolizability, transcendentality, and in­
comprehensibility.7
7 Thurman 1981, p.209.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
Thurman notes that there have been a large number of schools who could be 
put in that dualistic camp as well as many others that could be put in the 
opposing monistic camp. Thurman is noting something similar to the prob­
lem o f radical particularity in that the radical separation which dualism 
entails makes any sort of connection impossible.
Thurman also raises an issue concerning transcendence:
If God is totally transcendent, there can be no creation, no Word, 
no incarnation, etc. and no idea of “God” would have anything at 
all to do with it. The “transcendent ego” would belong to no one, 
the Tao would never get involved in the ten thousand things, and 
Nirvana could never be attained.8
As does dualism, a theory o f full transcendence separates the Ultimate from 
any point of interaction with the world.
On the other hand, an equally strict monism which makes the difference 
merely illusory is also inadequate: “Similarly, an absolute monism dictates 
the utmost incredulity regarding bifurcated consciousness, so obviously illu­
sory as not to warrant a second thought.”9 We have noted that the problem of 
radical particularity also makes absolute monism impossible because 
individuals remain in their particular natures. As they are, individuals cannot 
be unified with the One. In strong versions of monism, the differences man­
ifest to conscious beings are not so much explained as explained away.
We are still lacking a way to clarify what the relationship of a particular to 
the Ultimate might be. Thurman says, “Therefore, since by definition 
absolute dualism and absolute monism both preclude the possibility o f any 
sort of experience of anything Real, it follows that all spiritual experience 
lies somewhere between sheer confrontation and total union, each one
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representing a unique combination of elements of both.” 10 From the per­
spective of radical particularity, a position between absolute monism and 
absolute dualism also seems required for a consistent metaphysics. After 
accepting particularity as a working hypothesis, one needs to show how 
relationality can be described between separate individuals without requiring 
an absolute unity. Relationship to the Real requires that radical particularity 
be available without being subsumed.
10 Ibid,p.21O.
11 Ibid., p.211.
12 Ibid., p.215.
The thesis that Thurman defends is of a Buddhistic nondualism, which is some­
where between the two metaphysical extremes of monism and pluralism:
In Advaitavedanta, where the monistic totality of nirgunabrah- 
man-paramatman is powerfully emphasized and the world is dis­
missed as mere illusion, there is a radical opposition to the notion 
of an alienated creature utterly removed from his Creator. On the 
other hand, in more qualified forms of Hinduism and in all forms 
of Buddhist nondualism, the degree of sameness between devotee 
and deity is always less than total, or else is a kind of completeness 
wherein some form of pluralistic individualism is preserved.11
According to Thurman, Buddhism has historically recognized the funda­
mental problematic of relating two realities, the absolute and the relative, in 
a way that sees both a problem with monism and with pluralism.
The Buddha, according to Thurman’s review of the traditional account of 
his teaching, was unconvinced by the monist option purveyed by the Upa- 
nishadic priests of his time. Vedic monism seemed “strongly escapist in its 
yearnings for union with the cosmic whole, the world soul called brahman by 
the individualistic philosophers recorded in the early Upanisads.” 12 Some­
where, a connection must be found between the poles of samsara and 
Nirvana without fully identifying them. In Thurman’s terms, “pluralistic 
individualism” must be maintained at some level.
A first Buddhist attempt at a solution seems to be dualistic. The teaching 
of the Four Noble Truths is based upon a two-tiered universe. One level 
includes suffering, and a higher level is beyond suffering. Nirvana, the burn­
ing out of the fuel of suffering, is dualistically opposed to samsara. As 
Thurman interprets:
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The dualism taught here is truly one of the most extreme forms of 
that doctrine ever proposed. Nirvana is absolutely outside of the 
compounded world. It is uncreated, uncaused, deathless, and 
beyond all suffering, and yet ultimately ineffable, as no attribute 
can confidently be predicated of it.13
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p.217.
15 Ibid., p.218.
16 Ibid., p.219.
17 Ibid.
In this via negativa, all that can be said o f Nirvana is that it is other than sam- 
sara. Thurman further explains that Nirvana is not identical with a wide vari­
ety o f spiritual experiences including an experience of absolute 
nothingness.14 This underscores its ineffability and its difference from sam- 
sara. Yet, some Buddhist thinkers make the move of reifying Nirvana:
Of course, this rigorous otherness of Nirvana did not prevent 
numerous adherents of early monastic Buddhism, members of the 
eighteen sects of the individual Vehicle, from reifying Nirvana 
into something like a formless state, idolatrizing it into a kind of 
superheaven into which they are going to escape, and the Buddha 
into an emissary of that superheaven, or leader of the rush away 
from samsaric misery.15
From Nagarjuna’s Madhyamika perspective, this and other types of reifica­
tion are suspect and even naive. According to Thurman, Nagarjuna argues 
against the “naive reification of the immanence of the Body of Truth in all 
things, from the pure aggregates of a Buddha’s Form Body down to every 
atom in the universe.” 16 The Ultimate is, thus, not a separate thing nor is it 
the same thing as the universe.
At this point there is clearly a version of the problematic of how different 
things can be in relation: “In brief, if the Transcendent and the world were 
the same, intrinsically or really the same, what would be the use of the dif­
ferent names? And if they were intrinsically or really different, how could 
any positing of relationship between them be meaningful?” 17 This is a clear 
acknowledgment of a comparable concept to the problem of radical particu­
larity. The conclusion is that the dualistic view contained in the Four Noble 
Truths is inadequate.
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At this point, Thurman offers a “transcendentalist” view of otherness or 
Nirvana in its relationship to the conventional level of reality. It is worth 
reading in full:
Absolute reality cannot be captured by any concept, neither by 
“emptiness” nor by “fullness.” No assertions therefore should be 
advanced dogmatically, as any such assertion would be idolatrous, 
vitiating the critical transcendentality of the absolute. After all, any 
conceptualized idea is just as idolatrous as a golden calf, if it pre­
tends to be adequate to a reality in principle beyond any human con­
cept. Nevertheless, “empty” may be taught as a technique for de­
veloping the mind’s criticality of any attachment to sign, wishes, 
objects, or ideas. “Nonempty” may be taught to turn the mind 
away from quietist absorption in a reified absolute back into the 
dreamlike profuse richness of the world. “Both empty and non­
empty” may be taught to stretch our conceptuality to cultivate a 
tolerance of plurality, multivocality, and complexity. And “neither 
empty nor nonempty” may be taught to inculcate the antidogmat- 
ic, non-authoritarian openness to the word-transcending vivid 
reality of life that is so aptly greeted by the famous “silence of the 
Saints.” These four teachings are not advanced as final solutions, 
yet are all part of the conceptual pharmacopoeia of remedies for 
the illness of clutching at life with constructs, and are used to free 
conventional reality as a space of living.18
This view shows considerable complexity in dealing with many important 
soteriological themes. The pragmatic use of concepts frees the mind for the 
tasks one faces in squaring off with the realities of life and enjoying the 
dream-like encounters possible in that same life. However, in part because of 
the “transcendentality” of the Absolute, there is also no clear articulation of 
the relationship between the particular person to something that is other.
Nevertheless, the Buddhist position is not an anti-conceptualism in the 
sense of being a relativism. Thurman notes:
Words after all are meaningful, and reveal many aspects of reality, 
either ultimate or relative. It is only when they pretend to capture 
reality, to reduce it to their own construction, that they become
18 Ibid., p.222.
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traps, rather than the useful tools they are. So the Buddhist insis­
tence on the ineffability of reality is not at all a “nonrational,” 
“paradoxical” approach hopelessly mysterious to us “rational” 
“westerners,” but rather a precise and rationally derived demarca­
tion o f the limits of words. The silence of the saints is not a myste­
riously referential point beyond, but rather a judicious restraint in 
lenowing where to stop, in knowing where others must see for 
themselves, where no authority will provide genuine understand­
ing.19
Buddhism is not a position that asserts the meaninglessness of language and 
concepts. Although non-realist in its claim that language is limited, it still 
preserves a large area of linguistic validity. It is, therefore, not an extreme 
form of relativism. Rather, it recognizes the need to stop the process o f ratio­
nalization at some point. In other words, enlightenment is an experience, not 
a theory.
The problem of radical particularity also has a similar linguistic impli­
cation. If, in fact, each cosmic event is unique, it is, by its very nature, 
incommunicable. Somehow relationship does occur, and language and sym­
bolization may be a large part of the communication that occurs between 
particular people. But language is not capable of transferring the phenome­
nological experience of one person into the consciousness of another. That 
task is too large because language is an objective tool. That which language 
communicates is never the fullness of the two experiences of the two partic­
ular beings who are communicating, but only some limited aspect o f their 
experience. Yet, to say that language has intrinsic limits is not to be commit­
ted to the position that discourse is inherently unreasonable.
In spite of a generally non-theistic, non-monistic philosophy that stresses 
otherness, does not Buddhism sometimes return to monistic spiritualism at 
specific times in its history? The human desire for full communication with 
the Ultimate finds expression in the vastly large and intimately close indwell­
ing of Buddha(s):
Amitayus is both utterly real as a cosmic Beatific Body in a heav­
enly Buddha-land that dwarfs universes by the billions, whence 
emanate endless streams o f clouds of Buddhas to teach in innu­
merable solar systems in innumerable galaxies; a vision of massive
19 Ibid., p.224
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spiritual substance o f an immensity that dwarfs and yet embraces 
this puny human realm; and He is also one’s own mind. And the 
macro-micro interfusion is clearly evidenced in what is essentially 
a popular text (not that all its readers always paid all that much 
attention to it). This is truly a case of what Vimalakirti calls the 
“mystery of the placing of Mount Sumeru in a mustard seed.”20
20 Ibid., p.228.
21 Ibid., p.248.
22 Ibid., p.241.
23 Ibid., p.240.
To my mind, this reads similarly to “both-and” theologies which seek to 
preserve both God’s transcendence and God’s immanence. This is highly 
problematic from the perspective of radical particularity which stresses the 
uniqueness of the individual. Thurman’s point here is merely to show that the 
Buddhist tradition is not monolithic but possesses diverse possibilities (some 
of which may be metaphysically problematic).
As in the case of Western mysticism, there is in Buddhism, especially in 
its Tantric form, an experience of consubstantiality and union, “known as a 
union of calm and insight, [it] is the experience of the Body of Truth, is 
beyond time, ineffable, the perfect bliss of universal peace.”21 But this is a 
union of and between separates, not a merging of otherness into same:
The symbol here is that of full sexual embrace, an intimate union 
of opposites, male and female, wisdom and compassion . . . , 
although note that this is integration of “nonduality” wherein the 
duality is preserved in blissful contact, and is not the mere opposite 
of duality, namely unity, where the poles have been lost entirely.22
The meditative and libidinous techniques used to engender this experience 
are focused not on oneness but contact. The Deity is “both external and inter­
nal,” the “ninety million, billion, trillion” mile high Amitabha is within a 
mustard seed on the tip of the nose, yet not the nose.23
These images and practices can be described by a middle philosophy in 
which neither absolute monism nor pluralism is presented as the metaphysi­
cal truth:
[T]he basic Mahayana practitioner operates on the basis of the per­
ception of his goal as extremely remote and “other” than himself,
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although the awareness of the dynamism of the Buddhas’ compas­
sion serves to bridge the gulf between himself and Buddhahood, 
which gulf is of course radically unmitigated in the Hinayana total 
separation of Nirvana from samsara.24
The later Mahayana tradition may be thought of as stressing a middle posi­
tion between the Ultimate as Wholly Other (the Theravadan undying and 
unconditioned Nirvana) and the Ultimate as identical with reality (Hindu 
Brahman as Ultimately what is real). In this middle way, particularity and 
relationality are both maintained in terms of maintaining what is empty and 
what is nonempty.
Any attempt at a rigorous articulation of the relationship of the Ultimate to 
the particular begins to cross the boundaries imposed by the limits of lin­
guistic expression and conceptual apparatus. In spite of this recognition of 
the limits of language, I do not find a solution in suprarationalism that is fully 
acceptable. The suggestion appears to be that one should leave behind the 
ladder of rationality for the goal of the enlightenment. In principle, that may 
be an acceptable and admirable program. But I am not convinced that there 
is no more detailed way to articulate how relationship between the Ultimate 
and the particular is possible. And even if there is no conceptual way to clar­
ify that relationship, we would need more argumentation before we assent to 
the incomprehensibility of that relation. Before we throw our hands up and 
meditate (which perhaps we should be doing in addition to thinking rational­
istically anyway), one needs to be shown more clearly the need for such a 
drastic course of action, even if it is effective soteriologically. Other ways 
may be even more effective means of waking up.
Thurman makes clear that in the diversity of Buddhist world-views, there 
are a variety of resources in dealing with the relation of Ultimate Reality to 
samsaric experience. Theravadan dualism seems as inadequate as those 
Christian forms of dualism which assert the total otherness of Divinity (al­
though these may also be salvific). On the other hand, placing Mt. Sumeru 
within the mustard seed seems not so much physically improbable as meta­
physically impossible. Such an image symbolizes a monistic or both-and 
approach that is unacceptable from the perspective of radical particularity.
Thurman’s location of the problematic offers the benefit of avoiding both 
metaphysically suspect poles. His acceptance of an element of “pluralistic
24 Ibid., p.239.
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individualism” is comparable to the pluralism that is a metaphysical com­
plement of radical particularity.25 His middle position articulates the reasons 
for such suspicion. Additionally, his view of a non-conceptual middle way 
tries to describe suprarationality not as escapist but as itself an, at least par­
tially, rational decision. Although I am unclear whether such a supraratio­
nalism is called for, I have no other solution for the problem of radical 
particularity at the level of rational metaphysics. So, perhaps, the solution 
will ultimately reside in some form of nuanced silence.
25 On the pluralistic implications of radical particularity, see Simoni-Wastila 1999.
26 Abe 1968, pp.43-44.
27 Ibid., p.45.
Masao A b e’s Nondualism
As is Thurman, Masao Abe is deeply aware of the problematic of the relation 
of the particular with the Ultimate. His interpretation of Buddhism allows for 
a nonduality that is promising, though at the same time extremely difficult. 
Abe explains:
In order to realize the true Reality, we must transcend every sort of 
duality, even the duality of absolute and relative, God and man, or 
non-discrimination and discrimination. Only in this way is the true 
Reality realized as such without assumption. This is not monism, 
which is still related to dualism, or pluralism, but rather, non-dual- 
ism, which is able to let duality or relativity really stand and work 
in its duality and relativity.26
Abe connects the relationship o f absolute and relative with the concept of 
emptiness, as we will see. However, I will argue Abe’s ultimate position 
sometimes skirts very close to what could be called a both-and metaphysics, 
the Ultimate is both in its own realm and thoroughly connected with the rel­
ative level of being. “This means that the real absolute, being liberated from 
the very distinction between the relative and the absolute, is neither the rela­
tive nor the absolute in their ordinary (relative) sense; yet at the same time, 
it is both the relative and the absolute in their ordinary (relative) sense.”27
Admittedly, Abe’s position is difficult to make clear. It is hard to see how 
the “real absolute” could be liberated from the very distinction of the relative 
versus the absolute. Abe tries to explain more fully what is meant by the 
absolute being beyond the very distinction of absolute and relative: “This is
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why in Buddhism Nirvana is not simply something beyond samsara, but 
rather samsara in itself which is realized as samsara through the negation of 
‘Nirvana as something beyond samsara’.”28 It is difficult to sort out whether 
this is a blatant contradiction or an insight into subjectivity and particularity. 
There are at least three possible way of interpreting Abe’s position: 1) Does 
liberation consist in a denial that there is any duality in the first place? 2) Or 
is liberation the insight that the absolute fully encompasses both categories, 
both Nirvana and samsara? 3) Or does enlightenment consist in casting away 
conceptual apparatuses, such a dualistic models of reality, in order to experi­
ence what cannot be philosophically conceptualized or artistically represent­
ed? The last is the most likely.
28 Ibid.
29 Quoted in Katz 1978, p.164.
The first way of interpreting Abe is that there can be no simple duality. As 
Thurman noted, the simple dualism of the Four Noble Truths and the stark 
separation of Nirvana and samsara in southern or Theravadan Buddhism is 
not adequate, at least from the Mahayana perspective, which Abe also shares. 
And yet, the difficulty is showing how, by some sort of spiritual insight, 
Nirvana is seen to be samsara in itself. What is the meaning of the familiar 
Mahayana refrain that “Nirvana is samsara”? Although there is no simple 
duality, there is at least a provisional duality in how samsara is apprehended 
or valued. Abe denies that this preliminary duality is ultimately real, but it is 
not clear what follows from that denial.
A second way of interpreting Abe is as asserting a “both-and” meta­
physics. Both-and theories assert that Ultimate Reality is both transcendent 
and immanent. Abe relates his presentation of nonduality to shunyata (Skt. 
sunyata), emptiness, the root of both wisdom and compassion. It is helpful to 
use Frederick Streng in elucidating the role of emptiness. Streng confirms 
that there is no duality between nonduality and duality: “The knowledge of 
‘non-duality’. .. is not a knowledge of ‘non-duality’ as distinct from ‘duality’, 
but a release from the attachment to such a distinction. It is a knowledge that 
is a non-dualistically-oriented analytical knowledge into the empty nature of 
things whether perceived, felt, or imagined.”29 The perception of the empty 
nature of things, does not, however, lead to the assumption of some sort of 
Reality that, although beyond conceptualization, is the seat of “being.” 
Streng writes:
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Concepts and analytic mental activity are then to be discarded for 
a different and more perfect mode of knowledge: intuition. . . . 
However, the denial of the conventional constructions as expres­
sive of self-existent reality does not require the affirmation of a 
self-existent reality in the ultimate reality (suchness). . . . One is 
not required to affirm an absolute independent reality in the form­
less aspect of existence just because it is negated in the formed 
aspect.30
30 Ibid.
31 Abe 1968, p.47.
32 Ibid., p.48.
Here, intuition goes beyond the type of analysis that depends on dualism. 
The suprarational insight allows an indirect approach to ultimate reality. The 
Buddhist thinker becomes aware that there is no own-being in samsara, but 
this does not condone the postulation of an absolute that is not equally 
empty.
Samsara’s being Nirvana does not imply that there is a monistic whole. 
This is why Abe says duality must stand and really work (see the first cita­
tion of this section). Abe writes on emptiness: “Accordingly, sunyata is not 
a mere voidness but a living and creative Voidness in which boundless inter­
dependence between everything can take place and function without eradi­
cating the particularity of everything and without reducing everything to the 
one ultimate principle.”31 It is difficult to see how interdependence can occur 
while maintaining the “particularity” of everything. This seems to be the 
very nub of the problem of radical particularity.
Abe’s position seeks to ground interdependence without the reduction of 
the All to the One. For example, Abe differentiates his position from that of 
Charles Hartshorne’s all-inclusive absolute and relative God: “However, it is 
so not in a sense that, as Professor Hartshorne means, the relative includes 
the absolute, but in a sense that through the Realization of sunyata the rela­
tive in itself is the absolute.”32 Abe’s position is not a monism, but a position 
obtained through special insight above the rational level of discourse in 
which there are formulations of theories. Thus, Abe is not really asserting a 
both-and metaphysics, although his assertion of a “boundless interdepen­
dence” tends towards monism.
A third option for interpreting Abe is to take him as boldly casting to the 
winds the ladder o f rational discourse. From the side of ratio, this appears as
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a leap. This leap, whether a leap of faith or merely a leap towards intuition, 
has a clear religious involvement. Just sit. . . . Meditate and experience di­
rectly. . . .
However, are we ready to throw away the conceptual ladder just yet? We 
are faced with an enormously difficult question because of the problem of meta­
rationality: What are the criteria for suprarationality? Yet, isn’t that a rational 
question? Perhaps we should go as far as rationality takes us, until the very 
process of rationality unfolds itself. . . . But it is not clear what that means.
It is not clear how to judge whether or not dismissing rationality is an 
escapism from the difficult task of philosophizing, especially regarding the 
issue of particularity and interdependence. Is the situation truly suprarational 
or merely beyond our current state of analysis? This skepticism about intu- 
itionism should always guard against too easily attempting to ascend beyond 
the ladder of rationality. Yet refusing to critically consider the possibility that 
at some point rational procedures produce diminishing returns seems dog­
matic and is in that sense itself irrational.
In another context, Abe speaks about the identity of samsara and Nirvana: 
“Unlike the Judeo-Christian tradition in which the divine and the human, the 
sacred and the profane, good and evil, life and death are clearly distin­
guished, Mahayana Buddhism emphasizes the identity of samsara and 
nirvana, Buddha and sentient beings, body and mind, life and death and so 
forth.”33 The identity of these various elements seems to be monistic, as Abe 
certainly notes. Yet it is difficult to know exactly why it is not ultimately 
monistic.
Abe offers a longer explanation:
[Buddhism] appears to be quite monistic from a surface perspec­
tive. It is true that as a religion rooted in the profound awakening 
of Gautama Buddha, Buddhism is based on the one absolute truth 
through which everything is united. The aim of Buddhist life is to 
awaken to that one absolute truth and live it. However, to call the 
Buddhist idea of the one absolute truth monistic is quite problem­
atic. This is because the concept of monism arises by being distin­
guished and set apart from dualism (and pluralism) and it thus not 
a truly independent principle. Rather it is still dualistically related 
to dualism (and pluralism). Monism excludes dualism and plural­
ism and therefore stands in opposition to them. Since the term
33 Abe 1980, p.97.
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monism implies such connotationsf,] the Buddhist idea of the one 
absolute truth, which is termed dependent co-origination, empti­
ness, tathata or Buddha nature, can not be properly called monis­
tic. It should be called non dualistic rather than monistic.34
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p.98.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
In order to clarify what is meant by nondualism as opposed (or perhaps not 
opposed) to monism, Abe introduces a distinction between “monistic one­
ness” and “nondualistic oneness.” Abe describes the differences in terms of 
four points. We will discuss these four points in trying to make clear our 
third interpretation of Abe: that of suprarationalism. Suprarationalism is not 
a negation of rationalism; it is not an irrationalism. Suprarationalism means 
that rationalistic methods are seen as valid as far as they go. But in order to 
live a fully human life, rationality must be superseded. Suprarationalism 
makes of rationality a ladder whose last rung is a stepping stone to something 
higher.
The first point Abe considers is that “monistic oneness is still dualistically 
related to duality and plurality.”35 This seems a reworking of the original 
definition of monism. Monism is, however, a different theory than dualism: 
in that sense it is dualistically related to dualism. But if  monism asserts that 
all is composed of one type of substance or that the world is an all-inclusive, 
interconnected whole, this itself does not seem dualistically related to dual­
ism. If monism holds, then there is no dualism to be the contrast to monism. 
Nevertheless, the perspective of radical particularity agrees with Abe’s state­
ment that monistic oneness does not let duality really stand and do its work.
The second point is that monistic oneness is a goal that is reached, where­
as nondualistic oneness “is the ground or root-source realized here and 
now.”36 This is explained further: “When we overcome monistic oneness we 
come to a point which is neither one nor two nor many, but which is appro­
priately referred to as sunya, or empty. This emptiness or sunyata is true one­
ness in the sense of being completely free from any form of duality.”37 The 
realization of sunyata or emptiness adds something to monistic oneness that 
transforms it into nondualistic oneness.
This, again, seems a reworking of the point that nonduality is closely con­
nected with the central Buddhist concept of emptiness. Nonduality is “prop-
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erly referred to as” empty and this means “being completely free from any 
form of duality.”38 There is an evident circularity here. Besides that, it is dif­
ficult to see how emptiness makes a difference between the two types of 
monism. What is meant by coming to a point that is “neither one nor two nor 
many”?39 Is this a form of rejecting the whole enterprise of metaphysics as 
unsalutary for enlightenment? Yet, does that answer the question of monism 
or merely forestall it? Perhaps the mention of the root source is an experien­
tial category, but this does not solve metaphysical issue.
Thirdly, simyata is itself not to be conceived or objectified: “To reach and 
fully realize simyata, it is necessary to overcome conceptualization and 
objectification completely.”40 This point is consistent with Thurman’s view 
of the non-objectifiable silence of the saints. It would seem that Abe is offer­
ing an understanding of oneness that is of a fundamentally different level 
than a metaphysical analysis concerning what it means for one entity to be in 
relation with another. The attitude of the questioner is what is itself being 
called into question.
What the Buddhist answer is, then, appears to be not so much an “answer” 
but the suggestion that a different sort of wisdom, realization, or waking up 
is necessary: “The existential realization of simyata is a turning point from 
the objective approach to the non-objective, existential approach, from mo­
nistic oneness to nondualistic oneness.”41 Martin Heidegger’s term “existen­
tial” refers, generally, to a personal apprehension of a moment in its lived 
quality. It is not the conceptual analysis of that moment. By saying nondual­
istic monism is an existential monism, Abe means that nondualistic monism 
is not an objective account of the universe but a new way of approaching it. 
One gives up the attempt at a rational account for an insight gained in medi­
tation. This third point confirms that neither simyata nor nondualistic 
monism are merely conceptual constructions. They are conceptual construc­
tions used as tools for a religious awakening. The approach is not intellectu- 
alistic but existential. Abe’s position is most clear in making this essential 
point.
However, if the experience of emptiness is nondualistic, why is it referred 
to as “nondualistic”? This may be a problem arising out of the limits of
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
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language. “Nondualistic” is a conceptual term that is to bear the weight of 
showing that conceptualization needs to be transcended. Thus, Abe’s posi­
tion is that nondualistic monism is a refusal to play the game of making dis­
tinctions or dualisms. In that way it sets its course not in distinction to other 
courses—that would be dualistic—but it sets out with a refusal to use the 
conceptual approach. There are no distinctions made; hence, it is nondualis­
tic.
We might be tempted to think that Buddhist nondualistic monism is a 
dualism or a monism because our horizon of questioning arises out of dual­
istic thinking. Buddhist nondualism claims a different approach. Thus, our 
over-arching question concerning the metaphysics of particularity may orig­
inate in a manner of thinking which is itself problematic, according to Abe.
Abe offers a fourth point. He claims that non-Buddhistic monistic oneness 
is in opposition to the world: “Even though it can be all-inclusive[,] it is 
more or less separated from the particularity and multiplicity of actual 
entities in the world.”42 Here, there is a recognition of “particularity” and 
separation. Abe uses Vedanta and Baruch Spinoza as examples of a type of 
flawed monism. Opposed to this is a more fully inclusive monism, “[N]on- 
dualistic oneness which is based on the realization of siinyata includes all 
individual things, just as they are, without any modification. . . . There is 
no separation between nondualistic oneness and individual things. At that 
point the one and many are nondual.”43 The language seems to offer an all- 
inclusive monism. Abe claims that this is a nonsubstantial absolute, but the 
attribution of all-inclusivity seems unalterably monistic.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., pp.98-99.
However, if things are left “as they are,” they are left in their particularity. 
One could say that Buddhist nondualism means that one can approach and 
appreciate the individuality of all things non-conceptually. In this way, Bud­
dhism leaves individual things “just as they are.” One never needs concepts 
to see or to enter into relationship with the other. Hence, one is in potential 
relationship with all things when one possesses the attitude of emptiness. The 
four points Abe raises confirm our third way of interpreting him, namely as 
a suprarationalist.
Religiously, to follow the Mahayana path, one does not escape into 
Nirvana, but sees the needs of others through compassion. One can live 
redemptively in the real world of particular beings, returning with open arms
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into the marketplace. To be enlightened in this way is certainly a valid reli­
gious and ethical worldview. Abe writes beautifully of the wholesomeness 
and caring implicit in Buddhism:
This involves going beyond so-called samsara to attain so-called 
nirvana and, without abiding there, returning to so-called samsara. 
To move freely back and forth between so-called samsara and so- 
called nirvana without attachment to either of them, this pure 
dynamic function of saving both oneself and others, is no less than 
true nirvana in the Mahayana sense.44
These claims ground ethics in a non-escapism and a compassionate love for 
sentient beings. The return to the Boddhisattva ideal of saving others is aided 
by not substantializing Nirvana into an object separate from the realities of 
this world. The Buddhism which Abe describes, thus, offers a very healthy 
this-worldliness. Buddhism also offers us a healthy other-worldliness for 
greed, illusion and hatred are possible and must be transcended.
Abe’s points help to explain the Buddhist position more fully, but many 
metaphysical difficulties remain. Abe’s nondualism is a position carved out 
in awareness of the difficulties of relating Nirvana and samsara. This paral­
lels the theological problem of radical particularity. Buddhist nondualism is, 
for Abe, a non-conceptual approach. Things abide in their particularity just 
as they are, and Nirvana is not a separate reality. Somehow, the fact that all 
things are empty allows this. Although I do not find a solution to the problem 
of radical particularity, Abe’s position offers an insight into how one might 
approach the problem of how particularity could relate to Higher Reality, i.e. 
nondualistically. Although I cannot locate the point where rationality should 
be jettisoned in favor of intuition, there is, as of yet, no other solution to these 
issues.
Conclusion
Our conclusion is that the problem of the relation of particularity to the uni­
versal has been noticed with acuteness in the Buddhist tradition. The silence 
of the Buddha, his reluctance to delve into metaphysics, is a noteworthy 
response to these types of metaphysical issues from a soteriological perspec­
tive. What is problematic about such a methodology is that, although these
44 Ibid.
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metaphysical issues are difficult, there may be solutions which the approach 
by means of silence will not solve. Is there a higher conceptual level at which 
the antimony of the relationship of particularity and Higher Reality is re­
solved? That is an enormous question full of important repercussions for the 
philosophy of religion.
A suprarational intuition into emptiness lets some Buddhists claim that 
nonduality is the correct way of proceeding. The project of metaphysics can 
only reach so far. However, as we saw, the point at which the ladder o f ratio­
nality must be abandoned is ambiguous. A more metaphysical resolution, 
which sometimes is attached to suprarationalism, is to assert a monism. 
Ultimate reality and conventional reality are really one and in full relation. 
Of the two writers we have discussed, Abe seems to lean closer to that form 
of monism.
Abe ultimately offers a suprarationalistic insight which lets duality (which 
we can take as particularity) stand and do its work. In our terms, there is no 
monism that negates radical particularity by subsuming it in the Ultimate. At 
the same time, Nirvana is not seen as dualistically separated from this world 
o f samsaric particularity. The mistake o f positing a completely separate Ulti­
mate is avoided. Quite similarly, Thurman’s position recognizes the need for 
a middle position which does not negate a realm of validity for “pluralistic 
individuality.” Since there are strong temptations to settle this issue pre­
maturely with either an aloof Ultimate or an inclusive one, Abe’s and 
Thurman’s positions maintain the correct balance between kataphatic and 
apophatic aspects, i.e. a balance between what we know and what we do not 
know.
Another option is to continue the metaphysical quest for an answer to the 
problem of radical particularity. This option would probably be located with­
in a middle ground between absolute pluralism and absolute monism. This 
position would neither be dualistic (the extreme separation of Ultimate Real­
ity and the world) or monistic (identity of God and world). But beyond stay­
ing in abeyance between these two problematical positions, we must live. A 
nondualistic middle way recognizes the issue which we have identified as the 
problem of radical particularity. Furthermore, it allows room for existential 
presentness, perhaps wisdom, and at least tranquillity.
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